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FINDING A CURE IN THE COURTS:
A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
DISPARATE IMPACT IN HEALTH CARE
Sarah G. Steege*
There is no comprehensive civil rights statute in health care comparable to the Fair
Housing Act, Title I/7I, and similar laws that have made other aspects of society
more equal. After Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title I/7 served
this purpose for suits based on race, color, and national origin for almost four
decades. Since the Supreme Court's 2001 ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval,'
however, there has been no private right of aaion for disparate impact daims under
Title VI, and civil rights enforcement in health care has suffered as a result.
Congress has passed new legislation in response to past Supreme Court decisions
that read civil rights law too narrowly. In that tradition, this Note argues that courts
may interpret 5 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
as creating a private right of action for disparate impact in health care that is
available to diverse protected classes.
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INTRODUCTION
Health reform is one of the key achievements of President Obama's
administration, but as often happens, some aspects of this landmark legisla-
tion have received relatively little attention. While the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act2 prohibits insurance companies from denying cov-
erage based on preexisting conditions, imposing excessive waiting periods,
and increasing premiums based on certain factors, including gender and
disability,3 most of these anti-discrimination provisions will not take effect
until 2014 and do not include independent means of enforcement.' Sec-
tion 1557 of the bill, simply titled "Nondiscrimination,"' may provide a
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) [herein-
after PPACA].
3. See PPACA 5 1201,42 U.S.C. 55 300gg-300gg-3 (2011).
4. See NAT'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, ANALYsIs OF THE HEALTH CARE REFORM LAW:
PPACA AND THE RECONCILIATION ACT 20 (2010), http://www.healthlaw.org/images/
stories/PPACA_..Part_.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
5. PPACA 5 1557, 42 U.S.C. 5 18116 (2011), provides:
SEC. 1557. NONDISCRIMINATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as otherwise provided for in this tide (or an
amendment made by this title), an individual shall not, on the ground pro-
hibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et
seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et
seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal
financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or
under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency
or any entity established under this title (or amendments). The enforcement
mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX, section
504, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations of
this subsection.
(b) CONTINUED APPLICATION OF LAWS.-Nothing in this title (or
an amendment made by this title) shall be construed to invalidate or limit
the rights, remedies, procedures, or legal standards available to individuals ag-
grieved under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et
seq.), titleVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), or the Age Discrimi-
nation Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 611 et seq.), or to supersede State laws that
provide additional protections against discrimination on any basis described
in subsection (a).
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means of redress for these and other rights guaranteed by the bill. In addi-
tion, courts may find that § 1557 confers a private right of action upon
individuals who experience disparate impact discrimination in health care
on the basis of race, color, national origin,6 sex,7 age,8 or disability.9 Dec-
ades of segregated health services led to widespread racial disparities in
access to quality care and in treatment outcomes, and these inequalities
continue in the absence of sufficient oversight.'I This right of action may
ameliorate these differences in access by strengthening civil rights en-
forcement in health care.
When enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related
legislation, Congress envisioned that civil rights enforcement would be
conducted as a joint effort by federal agencies and private litigants."
Over the years, however, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has been
consistently underfunded and understaffed. 2 HHS OCR13 is charged
with investigating violations of health-related civil rights and privacy laws
(c) REGULATIONS.-The Secretary may promulgate regulations to im-
plement this section.
6. Protected by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 55 2000d-
2000d-7 (2011) [hereinafterTitleVI].
7. Protected by Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 5 1681
(2011) [hereinafter Title IX].
8. Protected by the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,42 U.S.C. § 611 (2011).
9. Protected by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (2011)
[hereinafter § 504].
10. Vence L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand the
Causes and Solutions to the Disparities in Pain Treatment, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 52, 52 (2001)
(citing "[n]umerous studies [that] have revealed that racial and ethnic ninority groups
often receive different and less optimal management of their health care than white Amer-
icans" and finding such disparities to be "the legacy of a racially divided health system").
See also Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights Litigation to
Address Race Discrimination and Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6 TEx. E ON C.L. & C.R.
1, 1-8 (2010).
11. See discussion of private rights of action, it!fra text accompanying notes 28-38.
12. See FY 2011 HHS Budget in Brief & Performance Highlights, US. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HumAN SERV., http://dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/index.htmil (last visited Mar. 3, 2011)
[hereinafter Budget in BrieJ] (HHS OCR's fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget is approximately
$41 million, with 280 full-time employees; HHS as a whole has a $901,927 million budget
with 72,923 full-time employees). See also Lado, supra note 10, at 27-31 (finding that HHS
distributes roughly eight times more federal financial assistance (FFA) than the Depart-
ment of Education, yet HHS OCR's budget is half of that allocated to its counterpart);
Dan Bustillos, Limited English Proficiency and Disparities in Clinical Research, 37 J.L. MED. &
ETHics 28, 31 & n.50 (2009); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement
in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the After-
math of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 215, 218 (2003).
13. "HHS OCR" will be used to denote the Office for Civil Rights at HHS.
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and reviewing providers' applications to join the Medicare program.14
Given such a broad statutory mandate and the ever-increasing number of
entities subject to its jurisdiction, the office has had difficulty ensuring
compliance.'" This trend reflects a failure to emphasize HHS OCR's
mission by HHS leadership and by Congress, as both entities are
responsible for the office's budget.'6 Due to its resource constraints, HHS
OCR's performance in monitoring discrimination against individual
patients and providers has suffered: the office prioritizes reforming
companies' business practices and states' administration of health programs
over responding to private complaints,'" which slows the processing of
such complaints." Moreover, in the past HHS OCR employees have been
inadequately trained to perform investigations, especially disparate impact
analyses. 9
The Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval further
impaired civil rights enforcement: the Court held that the private right of
14. See generally Office for Civil Riglits, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERV.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/index.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Of HHS OCR's
nine identified key priorities in FY 2009 and FY 2010, only one is directly related to
enforcing federal civil rights laws. Fiscal Year 2010 Budget in Brief OFFICE OF
THE SEC'Y, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
http://www.dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2010budgetinbriefx.htnl (last visited Mar. 3,
2011).
15. HHS OCR must monitor more than 500,000 FFA recipients, but in FY 2009
(the most recent year for which complete data are available), only 3,562 covered entities
took corrective action, and 2,314 made substantive policy changes as a result of HHS
OCR intervention. FY 2011 Online Performance (Appendix 2), OFFICE FOR CIvIL RIGHTS,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., http://www.dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/
index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter FY 2011 Online Performance Appendix].
HHS OCR reports that these numbers are low because the office received funding under
a continuing resolution for the first five months of FY 2009 and had to delay hiring new
investigators. Id. at 7. Since Alexander v. Sandoval, HHS OCR has been the only entity
authorized to take action against disparate impact discrimination in health care. The fact
that vital civil rights enforcement depends so much on Congress' unpredictable budget
process is troubling. See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Litigation, Integration, and Transformation: Using
Medicaid to Address Racial Inequities in Healh Care, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 325, 352
(2010).
16. Yearby, supra note 15, at 332 n.30 (finding that even when HHS is well funded,
the agency has sometimes decreased OCR's funding).
17. See Budget in Brief, supra note 12, at 95 (regarding a recent agreement with
Georgia: "[s]uch statewide agreements provide a cost effective way to ensure that the states
are in compliance with the law with respect to how they administer HHS-funded pro-
grams impacting the lives of tens of millions of citizens").
18. In FY 2009, 31% of civil rights complaints requiring formal investigation were
resolved within one year. FY 2011 Online Performance Appendix, supra note 15, at 4.
19. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 231 (finding HHS OCR staff
unable to "identify a 'nexus' between existing disparities and a [facially neutral] health
care practice or policy").
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action under Title VI was not available for disparate impact claims. 20
Although the decision did not affect plaintiffs' ability to sue based on
intentionally discriminatory treatment, HHS OCR became the only
entity empowered to address disparate impact discrimination in health
care following Sandoval. This unique authority makes the office's lack of
resources and marginalization even more problematic. 2'
Together, these limits on Title VI litigation and HHS OCR's
weaknesses leave many practices that contribute to inequality in health
care outside the bounds of civil rights enforcement. Many facially neutral
policies and practices may have an impermissible disparate impact on
certain communities. For example, a hospital's decision to limit its number
of Medicaid beds, to relocate to a wealthier neighborhood, or to refuse to
participate in the Medicaid program may often have a disparate impact on
communities of color.22 Hospitals may close or relocate certain services
believed to attract low-income patients, such as emergency care or
obstetrics. 23 Conversion of public and non-profit health facilities to for-
profit status may also have a disparate adverse effect on low-income and
minority communities in their service areas.24 Managed care companies
have used race-neutral criteria such as a neighborhood's socioeconomic
profile in establishing plan networks so that physicians of color are less
able to join.2" Finally, physicians may design office hours based on
insurance status in a way that discriminates against minority patients. 26 A
private right of action under § 1557 could provide a remedy for members
of protected classes affected by such discrimination and by conduct
20. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89. Since the provision of Title VI giving rise to its
right of action (. 601) reached only discriminatory treatment, and its regulations (promul-
gated under § 602) reached disparate impact, the statutory private right of action could
not be used against conduct proscribed only by the regulations.
21. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 217 & n.ll (commenting on HHS
OCR's lack of public or private response to Sandoval's dramatic increase in its responsibili-
ties).
22. Id. at 227. Authors note that, given the difficulties of the disparate impact bur-
den-shifting regime, claims challenging practices within the same geographic market are
more likely to defeat the legitimate business reason defense. Id. at 229. See discussion of
this regime, infra at note 116.
23. Vanessa Northington Gamble & Deborah Stone, US. Policy on Health Inequities:
The Interplay of Politics and Research, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 93, 118 (2006) (citing
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE: ACKNOWLEDGING DIsPARi-
TY, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION AND ENSURING EQUALITY, 76 (1999)).
24. Lado, supra note 10, at 10-11 (citation omitted) ("[T]he result of this process is
that '[clommunities with high proportions of Black and Hispanic residents [are] four times
as likely as others to have a shortage of physicians, regardless of community income. ").
25. Id. at 41-42 (citing Sara Rosenbaum et al., Civil Rights in a Changing Health
Care System, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 90, 92 (1997)).
26. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 227 n.59 (noting that physicians
may give Medicaid beneficiaries access to the office only during certain periods of time).
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proscribed by other antidiscrimination sections of the health care bill that
lack their own enforcement mechanisms.
27
This Note argues that courts should find a private right of action
available under § 1557 for disparate impact claims, which would neutralize
the effect of Alexander v. Sandoval and rejuvenate civil rights enforcement
in health care. Part I grounds this argument in the existing jurisprudence
governing when courts find private rights of action, particularly for
disparate impact. Part II applies this method of analysis to § 1557, finding
a private right of action under § 1557 in Part II.A and evaluating its
application to instances of disparate impact discrimination in Part II.B. In
keeping with modern courts' dominant approach, Part ll.B.1 begins with
a strict textual interpretation of § 1557; then Part 1I.B.2 places § 1557 in
context and evaluates the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's
legislative history and the bill as a whole; and Part II.B.3 analyzes § 1557
as a new addition to Spending Clause doctrine. Part III examines
counterarguments and limitations to this right of action, but concludes
that courts are likely to find it available to plaintiffs in at least some
circumstances.
I. AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR DISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIMS UNDER EXISTING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
A. Private Rights ofAction
At the time Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts
took an expansive view of plaintiffs' need to access justice and courts'
capacity to facilitate that process.2 Early cases finding such rights of action
proceeded from English and American common law governing the
availability of legal redress: legal rights and remedies were considered one
and the same, not separate inquiries,29 and judges were flexible in finding
rights of action where the legislature had created statutory rights and
27. See supra notes 3-4. See also PPACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2011) (pro-
hibiting insurance companies from rescinding coverage without specifying consequences).
28. E.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("When a federal statute
condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the con-
demnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal
questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy
which it has adopted.") (citation omitted). See also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
287 (2001) (finding Borak to represent "the understanding of private causes of action that
held sway 40 years ago when Title VI was enacted").
29. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66-69 (1992) (quoting 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23 (9th ed. 1783), and tracing the development of
this common law doctrine through Supreme Court cases in the 19th and early 20th Cen-
turies).
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duties.3" Courts followed this doctrine in the early to mid-twentieth
century to infer private rights of action under many statutes and to make
both equitable and financial remedies available when plaintiffs so required.3
Just three weeks before the Civil Rights Act was enacted, Justice Clark
epitomized this doctrine: "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose.'32 Given this legal regime, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
assuming that courts would apply these methods of analysis to the new
law.33  Legislators intended a public-private nexus of enforcement:
administrative action and litigation by the relevant federal agency,
supplemented by private plaintiffs' suits.34 This combination would be the
most effective way to enforce these statutes, given the government's limited
resources and the potential for politicized underenforcement. 3
Private litigation was also valued on its own merits as an efficient
method of achieving Congress' goal of combating discrimination.
Empowering individuals to litigate afforded injured parties some
compensation for their grievances, while forcing the discriminatory entity
to change its practices. In bringing a civil rights suit and obtaining an
injunction, the plaintiff was seen to act "not for himself alone but also as a
'private attorney general" vindicating a policy that Congress considered of
the highest priority."36 The suit would address behavior that no doubt
infringed upon others' civil rights as well.37 Such litigation was necessary to
30. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach,
76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2001) (Courts often "filled the void" when legislatures did not
provide enforcement mechanisms for such statutes, without asking whether the statute had
a right of action: "[v]iolation of the right alone required a remedy.").The author differenti-
ates between these three concepts: a legal right "imposes a correlative duty on another to
act or refrain from acting for the benefit of the person holding the right"; a right or cause
of action is "the right 'to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a
legal requirement'" (citation omitted); and a remedy is the relief granted by a court, such
as damages or an injunction. Id. at 68 n.3. "A cause of action thus connects a right and a
remedy. It is an essential link between a right and a remedy that enables the right to be
enforced. Plainly, if you have no cause of action, you have no right and no remedy." Id. at
108.
31. See, e.g.,Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
32. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433.
33. Drew S. Days 11, "Feedback Loop":The Civil Rights Act qf 1964 and Its Progeny, 49
ST. Louis U. L.J. 981, 1000 (2005).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L.
REv. 434, 450-51 (2007);Juliet Stumpf& Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through
Immigration Law: One Step Forvard, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.YU. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 131,
135 (2003) (finding that private actions are particularly important when the government is
"less likely to exercise its power on behalf of those who, lacking a majority in a democrat-
ic society, have less influence on the political process").
36. Waterstone, supra note 35, at 442 & n.23 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park En-
ters. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) and H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)).
37. Id.
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achieve adequate civil rights enforcement, particularly for statutes where
Congress intended this blend of public and private action.
31
Although the Civil Rights Act did not explicitly provide for a private
right of action, courts soon inferred such rights of action under the Act and
related statutes. Reasoning from Title VI precedent, the Supreme Court in
Cannon v. University of Chicago evaluated a female applicant's claim that she
was denied admission to the university based on her sex and found an
implied private right of action available to enforce Title IX.3" Cannon ex-
emplifies courts' tendency to analogize among similar civil rights statutes4°
and infer both Congressional intent and correspondingly similar legal in-
terpretations from parallel texts.'
The private right of action under § 504 is also the product ofjudicial
analogy. Like the Cannon Court, the Seventh Circuit-the first to be faced
with the question42-began its analysis of § 504's text and regulations using
the Supreme Court's standard for finding private rights of action as eluci-
dated only two years before in Cort v. Ash.43 As part of its analysis, the
38. Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General:A Modelfor Enforc-
ing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F 247, 254 (2009) (finding
that when the government enforces civil rights laws without private assistance, many vio-
lations go unpunished) (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969)).
39. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (finding that the existence of
a Title VI right of action had already been "squarely decided" in "an opinion that was re-
peatedly cited with approval and never questioned" between the time it was handed down
and Title IX's enactment five years later (citing Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 E2d
847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967))).
40. Congress used Title VI as the model in drafting § 1557's other listed statutes. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2011) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."). Title IX and the Age Discrimination Act substitute their own protected classes
with otherwise identical language. Section 504 uses the same text with a few modifica-
tions for the disability context: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination . 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2011).
41. Days, supra note 33, at 984 & n.27 (Congress "may have found ... some sense of
security in adopting and altering, only slightly, provisions that had already received legisla-
tive blessing and favorable judicial interpretation.").
42. See Lloyd v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 548 F2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). The court evalu-
ated disabled plaintiffs' claim that municipal defendants' failure to make their public
transportation systems accessible constituted discrimination and held that § 504 established
affirmative rights, implying a private cause of action under the statute to vindicate such
rights.
43. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) ("First, is the plaintiff'one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted: that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basical-
[VOL. 16:439
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court used legislative intent as evidence of affirmative rights under § 504.
For example, the court found that Congress enacted § 504 after the Su-
preme Court had held unanimously that Title VI conferred a private right
of action.14 Looking at the parallel language of Title VI, Title IX, and
§ 504, the court found that this "near identity" in phrasing among the
statutes meant that § 504 had been "patterned after" the other two stat-
utes.45 At least for that purpose, existing jurisprudence on Title VI's right
of action therefore controlled the court's evaluation of § 504.46 The court
then applied the Cort test and found an implied private right of action
under § 504. 4"
Since Cort, courts have grown significantly more exacting in find-
ing a right of action to be available to plaintiffs. While Cort elucidated
four factors to guide judicial analyses, the Court did not require that
those factors be given equal weight." Instead, "[tlhe ultimate question,
in respect to whether private individuals may bring a lawsuit to enforce
a federal statute ... is a question of congressional intent.' 49 Without finding
such specific intent, courts may not imply a right of action, regardless of its
compatibility with the statute or its policy merit more generally." Perhaps
reflecting this straitened standard, the Age Discrimination Act speaks more
directly to the question than the other civil rights statutes listed in § 1557,
referring specifically to federal district court actions by "any interested
person.""s Recent cases demonstrate plaintiffs' ability to obtain injunctive
relief against FFA recipients after exhausting their administrative remedies,
as required by the statute."
ly the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?") (citations omitted).
44. Lloyd, 548 F2d at 1280 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Bossier Par-
ish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 E2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967)).
45. Lloyd, 548 E2d at 1281, 1285.
46. Id. Other circuit courts soon followed suit in recognizing § 504 cases brought
under such an implied right of action. See Baker v. Bell, 630 F2d 1046, 1055 & n.21 (5th
Cir. 1980) (collecting cases from that and other circuits).
47. Lloyd, 548 F2d at 1284.
48. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
49. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 291 (2002) (BreyerJ., concurring) (finding
that Congressional intent is a vital question whether the statute at issue is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as in Gonzaga, or any other). See also Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
50. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (2011). Courts finding this right of action also rely on the
statute's legislative history, citing Congress' intent that the Act should "permit persons
harmed by violations of the Act to pursue a private civil suit for relief." JOAN M.
KRAUSKOPF Et AL., 1 ELDERLAW ADvoCACY FOR THE AGING § 3:20 (2d ed. 1993) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 95-1150, at 23 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3388, 3410).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(o (2011). See, e.g., Sindram v. Fox, 374 Fed. App'x 302 (3d Cir.
2010). Plaintiffs are unable to sue the agency itself where an adequate remedy is available
against the private defendant. See Smith v. Dep't of Educ., 158 Fed. App'x 821, 823 (9th
Cit. 2005). See also KRAUsKOPF ET AL., supra note 51 (citing Stephanidis v.Yale Univ., 652 E
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The Sandoval Court further clarified that courts do not find a right of
action based on the prevailing legal standards from the time the relevant
statute was enacted.53 No matter when a given statute was enacted, a court
would evaluate Congressional intent based on the current Supreme Court's
dominant approach to statutory interpretation: interpreting the statutory
language 4 and using legislative history for clarification."5
B. Disparate Impact
As outlined in Part I.A, courts have recognized private rights of ac-
tion under all four statutes listed in § 1557. Since Sandoval, § 504 is the
only one of § 1557's four listed statutes with a private right of action that
has been explicitly acknowledged as reaching claims of disparate impact
Supp. 110, 112 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1987); NAACP v.Wilmington
Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 E Supp. 290, 293 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd, 657 E2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981);
Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 E Supp. 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Suber v. Bulloch Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 722 E Supp. 736, 742 (S.D. Ga. 1989); Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809 (C.D. Ill.
1985); Hilow v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 1994WL 328625 (N.D.N.Y 1994)).
53. When the Sandoval respondents made this argument, the Court famously re-
plied: "Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not
accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287. If the goal
of statutory construction is to ascertain Congress' intent in passing a statute, however, it
would seem to follow that Congress drafts its language with contemporaneous legal stand-
ards in the background. See, e.g., Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 240-41 &
n.115 (characterizing this remark as "one of the more insulting passages in any Court
decision in recent memory" and citing cases where the Court took legal context into
account when interpreting legislation).
54. See Zeigler, supra note 30, at 126 & nn.328-29 (finding that courts often begin
statutory construction by analyzing the text both as a general approach and in implied
right of action cases).
55. WILLiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STAT-
UTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 849, 941-50 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS] (excerpting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppel-
late Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395, 401-06 (1950) (listing this approach among other canons of construction, each
with its counterpoint); outlining the arguments made by legal realists, critical scholars,
economists, linguists, and those who find canons of construction to be a way to draw
"public values" from other sources into interpreting the text (internal citations omitted)).
But see ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra at 989 (Justice Scalia has criticized this use of
legislative history, calling the text "the alpha and the omega of statutory interpretation"
since only the statute itself was enacted as "authoritative law" under the Constitution. This
critique has pushed the Court to be more cautious in its evaluation of legislative history
and motivated those who argue before it to "lead with their textual arguments and use
legislative history to back up these contentions rather than as the touchstone of statutory
meaning."). Nonetheless, many commentators still find legislative history helpful, id. at 990
n.j, and Justice Scalia seems to be an outlier on the Court in his broad rejection of legisla-
tive history, id. at 990-91.
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discrimination. 6 The Supreme Court recognized plaintiffs' claims under
§ 504 for the purposes of proceeding to the merits in Alexander v.
Choate, analyzing whether Tennessee's reduction in the number of annu-
al inpatient hospital days covered by Medicaid was an actionable
disparate impact under the § 504 statute or regulations."s
The Court held two years earlier in Guardians Association v. Civil
Service Commission of New York City that Title VI proscribed only inten-
tional discrimination, 8 and the relevant language in § 504 was similar to
that in Title VI. s9 In Choate, Tennessee argued that § 504 had the same
limited scope.60 The Choate Court agreed with the state's premise-that
since § 504 was "modeled in part" on Title VI, "the evolution of Title VI
regulatory and judicial law is therefore relevant to ascertaining the in-
tended scope of § 504"-but also cautioned against "too facile an
assimilation of Title VI law to § 504. ' '61 Moreover, the Court found that,
to the extent that Guardians was relevant in interpreting § 504, Guardi-
ans suggested that § 504's regulations "could make actionable the
disparate impact challenged in this case."62
56. The Sandoval Court clarified that the private right of action under Title VI is
limited to intentional discrimination. No court has yet ruled on whether the right of ac-
tion under the Age Discrimination Act is available for disparate impact claims, but actions
with "disproportionate effect on persons of different ages" are permissible in certain cir-
cunistances. 45 C.ER. § 91.14 (2011). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question
of whether the implied private right of action under Title IX encompasses disparate im-
pact, and lower courts have split on the issue. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal
Protection, 28 HARv.J. L. & GENDER 217, 250-51 nn.247-48 (2005) (citing against disparate
impact Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 2000); Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 648 F2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1981);Weser v. Glen, 190 E Supp. 2d 384,
395 (E.D.N.Y 2002); citing in support of disparate impact Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991
E2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1998); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Coll. & Occupational Educ., 813
F2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987); Mehus v. Emporia State Univ., 295 E Supp. 2d 1258,
1271 (D. Kan. 2004); Sharif v. N.Y State Educ. Dep't, 709 E Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y 1989)).
Some courts, though, have used standards of intent in Title IX sexual harassment cases that
were significantly more lax than intent is construed under the Equal Protection Clause.
Cohen, supra at 252-53, 253 n.262. Despite their parallel text, the Supreme Court has also
interpreted Title IX and Title VI differently "when their distinct histories require." Id. at
276-77, 277 n.390 (citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,529 (1982)). Finally,
the Title IX disparate impact regulations, like those under 5 504, were debated in Congress
but not disapproved, id. at 246-47, which may also give rise to the presumption that they
reflect Congress' intent. See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
57. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
58. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983). Despite this
limit on Title VI itself, the Court also held that agencies' Title VI regulations defining ac-
tions with impermissible disparate impacts were valid. Id. at 584 & n.2.
59. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2011), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2011), supra note
40.
60. Choate, 469 U.S. at 292-94.
61. Id. at 293 n.7.
62. Id. at 294.
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The Choate Court recognized two other considerations that would
motivate analyzing § 504 more independently from Title VI: the influence
of Title VI-specific interpretations on the Court's ruling in Guardians63 and
the distinct legislative history of § 504. The antidiscrimination provisions of
Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act had been in effect for several years
when the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted, and Congress was aware
that agencies' regulations under those statutes included a disparate-impact
standard. 64 When Congress later adopted language in § 504 similar to that
of Title VI, the members were aware that the Title VI language "consistently
had been interpreted to reach disparate-impact discrimination."6' By refus-
ing to limit § 504 to intentional discrimination, "Congress could be
thought to have approved a disparate-impact standard for § 504."6 Distin-
guishing Title VI based on these factors enabled the Court to find a private
right of action for disparate impact claims under § 504.
In finding that § 504's private right of action was available for at
least some cases of disparate impact, the Choate Court also relied on the
fact that this interpretation was necessary to give effect to Congressional
intent.6 When § 504 was passed, Congress perceived such discrimination
as "the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and
indifference-of benign neglect.' ' 68 If the language were construed to lim-
it the Act only to intentional discrimination, it would be "difficult if not
impossible" to reach much of the conduct Congress hoped to change. 69
63. For seven Justices on the Guardians Court, the question of whether Title VI itself
reached disparate impact claims had already been answered in University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and it was unclear how they would have ruled
absent the force of stare decisis. Choate, 469 U.S. at 294 n.11. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at
612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Were we construing Title VI without
the benefit of any prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude that the
statute was designed to redress more than purposeful discrimination.").
64. A Presidential task force and the Department of Justice drafted model Title VI
enforcement regulations, and every Cabinet department and some 40 federal agencies
adopted parallel standards. Choate, 469 U.S. at 294-95 n.ll (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at
629-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). These regulations were controversial: in 1966, the House
of Representatives considered but rejected an amendment that would have limited Title VI
to intentional discrimination. Id.
65. Id. at 295 n. 11.
66. Id. at 294 n. 11. Although courts are often hesitant to adopt this pattern of rea-
soning, the inference here is stronger given that this is not simple Congressional inaction:
Congress considered but did not overturn the agency's interpretation. See infra notes 106,
107, and 156 and accompanying text.
67. Choate, 469 U.S. at 296-97 (citing senators' descriptions of the problems that
they hoped to fix with the bill and concluding that "[t]hese statements would ring hollow
if the resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting from action that discrinii-
nated by effect as well as by design.").
68. Id. at 295 (citing floor statements by members of Congress who sponsored
504 or were otherwise pivotal in ensuring its inclusion in the Rehabilitation Act).
69. Id. at 296-97.
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But evaluating the impermissible impact of otherwise neutral policies and
practices on individuals with disabilities is difficult, since they are not
"similarly situated" to those without disabilities. The Court did not want
to impose such a burden absent a clear statement of Congress' intent to
that effect.71 The Court therefore "assume[d] without deciding that § 504
reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact, '" 72
without further defining the scope of cognizable claims.
73
As Ricci v. DeStefano is the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation
of disparate impact doctrine, a brief discussion of this case is relevant here.
7 4
In Ricci, the Court held that the city of New Haven could not discard test
results that would have led to racially unequal promotions in the fire
department. 7 Discarding the results would constitute "race-based action ...
impermissible under Title VII" of the Civil Rights Act7 6 unless the city
could demonstrate "a strong basis in evidence" that absent that action, it
would be liable for disparate impact under Title VII.77 Ricci marked the first
time that the Court found the doctrines of disparate impact and disparate
treatment in conflict under Title VII. 7s Although the majority chose not to
reach plaintiffs' claim that the city's action also violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause,7 9 the decision generated significant controversy over the future
of disparate impact suits, both in theory and in practice.80
70. Id. at 298-99 (finding that a pure disparate-impact model as applied to individ-
uals with disabilities would impose an excessive burden on FFA recipients and require
intense administration and enforcement by agencies).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 299.
73. Later, the Sandoval Court included § 504 as an example of a statute whose regu-
lations were an "authoritative interpretation": given its unique history, the Sandoval Court
found it reasonable that agencies had interpreted § 504 to cover disparate impact discrimi-
nation and, accordingly, respected the Choate Court's finding of a disparate impact right of
action under § 504. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001) (citing Choate, 469
U.S. at 299,309).
74. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
75. Id. at 2664-65.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2011).
77. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
78. See Richard A. Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341,
1344 (2010) ("Ricci portrayed disparate impact doctrine as creating an exception to Title
VII's prohibition on formal or intentional discrimination. The view that disparate impact
doctrine constitutes an exception to disparate treatment doctrine entails the view that the
two doctrines are conceptually in conflict-or, more precisely, that they would be in con-
flict if one were unable to carve itself out of the other.").
79. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
80. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 78, at 1344 ("A conflict between disparate impact
and disparate treatment is also a conflict between disparate impact and equal protection.
And that makes things look bleak for the disparate impact standard."); Girardeau A.
Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEo. L.J. 1133, 1147 (2010) (expressing doubt that the
"strong basis in evidence" standard could ever be satisfied); Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v.
DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 Nw. U.
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It is unclear how the Ricci Court's questions about disparate impact
will affect cases brought outside the Title VII context. However, lower
courts may read the ruling as a statutory decision that is not even relevant
to all Title VII cases.8' The Supreme Court also seems reticent to address
the Constitutional question: in a Title VII disparate impact case decided
eleven months after Ricci, the Court confined its holding to "the only
question presented[:] ... whether the claim petitioners brought us is
cognizable. Because we conclude that it is, our inquiry is at an end." 2
Furthermore, all of the decisions applying Ricci to date concerned claims
that were brought under Title VII. Finally, of several potential readings of
the Ricci premise, only one-that ameliorating disparate impact requires
actions that are "per se in conceptual conflict" with disparate treatment
and, therefore, equal protection-is fatal to the future of disparate impact
more generally.83 Despite the uncertainty that Ricci may have injected into
disparate impact doctrine, courts are likely to analyze § 1557 in keeping
with its predecessor civil rights statutes-Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the
Age Discrimination Act-rather than Title VII.
II. SECTION 1557's PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DIsPARATE IMPACT
This Part applies to § 1557 the standards that modern courts use to
analyze whether a private right of action exists under a given statute and
whether such a right extends to disparate impact. Courts may find that
Congress intended to incorporate the listed statutes' existing rights of ac-
tion within § 1557's enforcement mechanisms. Based on a review of
§ 1557's text, legislative history, and context within PPACA and Spending
Clause jurisprudence, the right of action under § 1557 should extend to
disparate impact claims.
L. REv. 411, 426 (2010) (finding that although Ricci "at least theoretically ... made
things more complicated," employers may still have room to maneuver in taking actions
that would have disparate impact on non-minority employees).
81. See, e.g., United States v.Vulcan Soc'y, 637 E Supp. 2d 77, 83 (E.D.N.Y 2009)
(distinguishing Ricci on the grounds that Ricci evaluated a potential disparate impact viola-
tion of Title VII, whereas Vulcan Society addressed an actual violation); c. NAACP v. N.
Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 707 E Supp. 2d 520, 531 n.8 (D. NJ. 2010) (finding that
although Vulcan Society reached the "correct Ricci result, ... by its terms [Ricci] applies not
just to its unique facts, but to any situation when the demands of Title VII's disparate
treatment and disparate impact mandates present conflicting demands").
82. Lewis v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191,2200 (2010).
83. See Primus, supra note 78, at 1344-45 (finding that courts may distinguish be-
tween "formally race-neutral actions intended to improve the position of disadvantaged
racial groups" (1) that are taken by courts as opposed to those taken by public employers,
as in Ricci, and (2) "those that have visible victims [as in Rico] and those whose costs are
more diffuse").
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A. Private Right ofAction
Courts will likely begin with a plain reading of the statute. Judges
will search for textual evidence of Congress' intent to create both a
cognizable right-which usually must be vested in a particular class of
people whose interests are entitled to be vindicated-and a private right
of action enabling that class of people to bring suit. 4 Section 1557 satis-
fies both requirements. Courts look first for rights-creating language in
the statute at issue.85 The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the
relevant language in § 1557 as creating such rights when used in other
civil rights statutes.16
Second, courts should find that Congress intended a private right
of action to be available under § 1557 by virtue of its list of statutes. The
four laws that give rise to § 1557's enforcement mechanisms have
judicially recognized private rights of action that are also made available
for violations of this provision.8 7 When Congress has referred to prior civil
rights statutes in bill text, courts have both inferred a private right of
action and made available a previously implied private right of action
under the new statute.8 8 In effect, Congress is deemed to have intended
the incorporation of contemporaneous legal interpretations into the
new statute. 9 This "re-enactment rule" applies when a statute is literally
84. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)). See also Zeigler, supra note 30, at 68 n.3 (distinguishing the
related concepts of a right, a private right of action, and a remedy).
85. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283-84 ("For a statute to create such private rights
[of action], its text must be 'phrased in terms of the persons benefited.'" (citations omit-
ted)).
86. Id. ("Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 create individual rights because those statutes are phrased 'with an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class."' (citations omitted)). Compare § 1557 text, supra
note 5, with Title VI and Title IX text, supra note 40.
87. PPACA 5 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2011). Such rights are among the "en-
forcement mechanisms provided for and available under" those statutes. See text
accompanying notes 138-144 for discussion of the phrase "enforcement mechanisms" as
including such rights of action.
88. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (finding that both the
Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 have private rights of action by virtue of statu-
tory allusions to Title VI).
89. "When a subsequent Congress assumes one interpretation of an earlier statute
and acts upon that assumption in enacting a new statute, the Court will consider that as
evidence in favor of the assumed interpretation." ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note
55, at 1042. See also id. (Justice Scalia argues "that the Court should generally be reluctant
to imply causes of action to enforce federal statutes, but not when Congress has relied on
that understanding in subsequent legislation." (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 77-78 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)));Three Rivers Ctr. for
Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 382 F3d 412, 425 (3d Cir. 2004)
("[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Con-
gress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the
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re-enacted, when one statute borrows language from another, and when a
statute incorporates another by referring to its title.9 The presumption of
Congressional intent is even stronger when, as here, the statutes are within
the same jurisdiction (in pari materia) or were modeled after each other.9 '
By cross-referencing these statutes and thus incorporating their enforce-
ment mechanisms, Congress intended for the text itself to give rise to this
right of action.92
B. Disparate Impact
As outlined above, Congress used Title VI as a model in drafting
several other civil rights statutes. As a result, courts often rely -at least in
part-on the language that is shared by Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the
Age Discrimination Act to construe the subsequent statute consistently
with prior judicial interpretations of Title VI.93 Since Congress used the
parallel language of Title VI,Title IX, % 504, and the Age Discrimination
Act in drafting § 1557, 94 § 1557 may join this family of related statutes.
In keeping with Title VI jurisprudence after Sandoval, courts may find
reason to restrict the availability of § 1557's statutory private right of ac-
tion to intentional discrimination. Notwithstanding this concern, the
Supreme Court has cautioned against "too facile an assimilation of Title
VI law" into other areas, 9 especially in statutes distinguished by variations
in text or Congress' intent.96 Just as the Choate Court differentiated be-
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute." (quoting Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978))).
90. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 78-
84 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Inaction] (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485
U.S. 617 (1988) (per curiam); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580; United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs of
Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978)).
91. ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1076.
92. See Three Rivers Ctr, 382 F3d at 426 ("[A]lthough the remedy available to per-
sons aggrieved by violations of the Rehabilitation Act ... is at root an implied one, [the
statute], by cross-referencing Title VI, which already had been interpreted as creating a
private right of action, arguably [contains an] explicit provision[] creating a private right of
action.").
93. See supra notes 39-41.
94. "An individual shall not, on the grounds [prohibited under the listed statutes]
.... be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under" certain health programs. PPACA § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a)
(2011). Cf statutory text for Tide VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination Act,
supra note 40.
95. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,294 n.7 (1985).
96. ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1076 ("As Lorillard [v. Pons]
exemplifies, courts routinely assume that, unless there are strong indications to the contra-
ry, the newer statute should be interpreted consistently with the older statutes upon which
it was modeled."). Such strong indications could include changing political preferences or
priorities: "the new statute may embody policies or compromises subtly different from
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tween § 504 and Title VI, courts are likely to distinguish § 1557 from Title
VI and find § 1557's private right of action available for disparate impact
claims.
1. Section 1557's Language
In Sandoval, the Court emphasized the need for symmetry between
conduct prohibited by a statute and the right of action arising under
that statute. Courts will not recognize a disparate impact claim based on
a statutory right of action if regulations promulgated under the statute-
as opposed to the statute itself-proscribe disparate impact discrimina-
tion.97 In other words, § 1557 itself must indicate Congress' intent to
proscribe disparate impact discrimination in health care for a statutory
right of action to apply.
Given the language of § 1557, courts are likely to find such intent.
With "the enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under" Title
VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination Act,9 § 1557 invokes the
conduct proscribed by these statutes' regulations in addition to the
conduct proscribed by the statutes themselves. It would appear that no
other legislation enacted to date has used such a phrase,99 marking a
significant departure from previous civil rights statutes.' 0 The section
already incorporates the text of the other statutes with the phrase
"provided for."'0 ' Since courts assume that legislation avoids redundancy,
those in the similar statutes-if for no other reason than the different political context of
the later statute." Id. at 1074 (providing as an example Congress' focus on disparate impact
discrimination in enacting § 504 as opposed to intentional discrimination in passing Title
VI (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 294-95 n.ll)).
97. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285-89 (2001) (The implied right of ac-
tion under Title VI is not available for disparate impact: 5 602, the provision in Title VI
requiring agencies to promulgate the regulations that ultimately clarified the statute's cov-
erage of disparate impact, shows no Congressional intent to create a private right of action
and, further, the regulations "do not simply apply § 601-since they indeed forbid con-
duct that § 601 permits."). This was a marked change from courts' earlier interpretation.
Every federal Court of Appeals that had considered the question had found that Title VI's
private right of action was available to enforce both the statute and its regulations. Rosen-
baum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 225 n.53 (collecting cases).
98. PPACA § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
99. The author was unable to find this phrase in any legislation when conducting a
search of Thomas (the federal government's database of legislative information since 1989)
and the Westlaw and LexisNexis legislative databases (March 2,2011).
100. See EsKlIGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 867 ("From the general
presumption that the same expression is presumed to be used in the same sense through-
out an Act or a series of cognate Acts, there follows the further presumption that a change
of wording denotes a change in meaning.").
101. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 § 1-201(d) (Nov. 2, 1980)
(requiring the Attorney General to coordinate implementation and enforcement of a few
specific civil rights statutes and "[a]ny other provision of Federal statutory law which
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"available under" must add meaning °2 and likely denotes the regulations
promulgated pursuant to those statutes.
As in § 1557, the term "discrimination" is not defined in Title VI,Title
IX, § 504, or the Age Discrimination Act; instead, each federal agency in-
cluded a definition when promulgating regulations under each statute.' 3
Title VI's regulations, which are statutorily required to be "consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assis-
tance"0 14 include a definition of discrimination that proscribes actions with
a disparate impact on its protected classes."10 The regulations under Title IX,
5 504, and the Age Discrimination Act follow that lead. 6 Courts have
found that Congress' acquiescence in failing to react to executive agency
regulations, whether by striking down the regulation or by changing the
statute itself, indicates Congress' intent for such interpretations to flow from
statutory language.07 This presumption is strongest as applied to "building
block interpretations": authoritative or settled interpretations that have
generated reliance interests in the affected parties' behavior and in deci-
sion-makers' ongoing development of legal rules.' Given Congress'
reliance on Title VI jurisprudence and regulations in drafting subsequent
statutes, the Title VI regulations' definition of discrimination is entitled to
this presumption. Accordingly, these regulations-prohibiting actions with
provides, in whole or in part, that no person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, national origin, handicap, religion, or sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance.") (emphasis added).
102. "It is a 'cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be
construed to be entirely redundant.'" ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 865
(quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)).
103. See Days, supra note 33, at 1000 (Congress delegated the authority to issue regu-
lations "to reduce the general language of the [Civil Rights Act and subsequent related]
statute[s] to practical and operative terms for the guidance of all likely to be affected:').
104. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d-1 (2011).
105. 45 C.ER. 5 80.3(b)(2) (2011). The twenty-two federal agencies that offer FFA
modeled their Title VI rules on those drafted by HHS, which are still valid and have never
been significantly amended. Rosenbaum &Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 221.
106. For HHS regulations defining discrimination under these statutes, see 45 C.ER.
5 86.21(b)(2) (2011) (Title IX regulations on discrimination on the basis of sex in admis-
sions); id. § 84.4(b)(4) (§ 504 regulations); id. 5 91.11 (Age Discrimination Act
regulations). But see id. % 91.13-.14 (providing regulatory exceptions to the Age Discrim-
ination Act, including certain actions with permissible disparate impact).
107. "[T]he Court will often find that congressional failure to disapprove of execu-
tive department regulations, while 'not dispositive ... strongly implies that the regulations
accurately reflect congressional intent'" Eskridge, Inaction, supra note 90, at 74 (quoting
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 558 (1984)) (citing additional cases). See also
ESKIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1048 (on Congress' presumed acquies-
cence to "an authoritative agency or judicial interpretation of a statute" if the statute
remains unchanged).
108. ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 110.
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a disparate impact as well as those with discriminatory intent-may be
presumed to reflect Congressional intent.
In drafting this section of the health care bill, Congress referred
simply to "discrimination," which should be deemed to have the same
meaning as the listed statutes.' 9 Congress was aware that these statutes'
regulations proscribe disparate impact."' By incorporating the enforcement
mechanisms "provided for and available under" such statutes,"' it would
appear that Congress intended to include their disparate impact standard in
§ 1557's text. Section 1557 authorizes the Secretary of HHS to promulgate
regulations," 2 which may be helpful to clarify the provision in other
ways." 3 Still, since § 1557's text gives rise to its coverage of disparate
impact, courts are likely to find that plaintiffs may bring disparate impact
suits under § 1557 even absent such regulations." 4
2. Section 1557 in Context
In interpreting potentially ambiguous statutory provisions, courts
seek to put the disputed language into context by reading the statute as a
consistent whole."' Disparate impact cases in health care have often failed
due to the data-intensive requirements for such litigation and plaintiffs'
difficulty in meeting their burden of proof.1 6 Plaintiffs frequently lack the
109. Id. at 866 (finding that where a word has a "settled meaning" in related statutes,
that meaning is presumed to apply in a new statute).
110. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
111. PPACA 5 1557(a), 42 U.S.C.S 18116(a) (2011).
112. PPACA § 1557(c), 42 U.S.C. §18116(c) (2011).
113. For example, Congress probably intended § 1557's enforcement mechanisms to
be available against discrimination that is proscribed more specifically by other sections of
PPACA Title I. Section 1557(a) refers to other provisions in Title I: "Except as otherwise
provided for in this title" prefaces the ban on discrimination. PPACA's prohibition on
charging discriminatory premium rates based on specific factors (including age and gen-
der) includes a caveat: premiums may vary up to certain ratios. See PPACA § 1201, 42
U.S.C. § 300gg (2011). In other words, § 1557 may afford plaintiffs a remedy for violations
of those sections, within limitations imposed by the sections themselves.
114. See Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Home-
owners Insurance, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 1993, 2006-07 & n.117 (2006) (citing Fair Housing
Act cases from every circuit but one where courts recognized disparate impact claims
without HUD regulations, by analogizing to Title VII). Both the Fair Housing Act and
§ 1557 grant permissive rulemaking authority, providing that the Secretaries of HUD and
HHS, respectively, "may"--rather than "must" or "shall"-issue rules to implement the
statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614a (2011); PPACA 5 1557(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 18116(c) (2011).
115. See ESKRIDGE, CASES & MArERIAS, supra note 55, at 862 (presuming legislation
to be "internally consistent in its use of language and in the way its provisions work to-
gether").
116. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 226-27. A plaintiff must first make
out a prima facie case through statistical evidence of a facially neutral barrier's dispropor-
tionate adverse impact on a protected group. The defendant must then justify the practice
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statistical data necessary to make out a strong prima facie case and the
requisite analysis and business-specific information to rebut defendants'
defenses that their conduct was necessary for business reasons." 7 PPACA
contains another provision, § 4302, which requires extensive, specific
collection and public reporting of data on health disparities by all
federally conducted or supported health programs, activities, and surveys,
as well as by state Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program
(CHIP) agencies.'18 To the extent that such disparities may point
to disparate impact discrimination,"9  4302 may alleviate plaintiffs'
difficulties in establishing a prima facie case.
Courts also look to a statute's legislative history to illumine
Congress' intent. Although the health reform bill's legislative history
never refers specifically to § 1557,12 many members of Congress spoke
expansively about the impact they hoped PPACA would have in
combating discrimination in health care and made no indication that
this impact should be limited to cases of intentional discrimination.'
as serving a legitimate purpose, frequently using a defense of business necessity. If the de-
fendant succeeds, the plaintiff must rebut the defense by finding an alternative policy with
a less discriminatory impact. Id. at 227-28.
117. Id. See also Lado, supra note 10, at 36-37 (finding that the need for statistical
evidence presents proof problems).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 300kk (2011). Medicaid and CHIP are administered by state gov-
ernments and financed jointly by the state and federal governments. For more information
regarding these programs, see Medicaid Program-General Information, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERV., http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidGenlnfo/ (last modified Feb. 23, 2011,
7:33 AM); National CHIP Policy: Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV.,
http://www.cms.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy (last modified Feb. 8,2011, 7:25 AM).
119. See Bonham, supra note 10, at 52; Lado, supra note 10, at 1-8.
120. Section 1557 was not mentioned in any floor speeches during Congress' debate
on PPACA. See http://thomas.gov/ (follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink; select 111th
Congress; search for Bill Number H.R. 3590; then follow "All Congressional Actions with
Amendments" hyperlink to access links to the relevant CONGRESSIONAL RECORD pages).
See also 156 CONG. REC. S11578, S11826-79, S11888-903, S11907-67, S12462-66,
S12524-552, S12565-613, S12648-69, S12745-99, S12836-76, S13131-32, S13205-42,
S13280-95, S13477-89, S13558-628, S13640-95, S13714-51, S13796-866, S13890-
14132, H1854-2169 (2009-10). This language was not present in any of the bills that
passed out of the House and Senate committees ofjurisdiction, which is often true of civil
rights legislation. See ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 982. Due to the
process by which PPACA was passed, there is also no conference committee report which
might have included a section-by-section description of Congress' intent. Id. at 972 n.d
(citing OTTO HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS CASES AND MATERIALS 589 (3d
ed. 2001)).
121. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S11908 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Our dear friend, Senator Ted Kennedy, said it so
well in the letter about the health reform imperative that President Obama read to a joint
meeting of Congress. . . .'What we face is above all a moral issue; that at stake are not just
the details of policy, but fundamental principles of social justice and the character of our
country.'This is such a time. It is my hope and belief the Senate I love will once again rise
to the occasion."); 156 CONG. REC. S11988 (2009) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus,
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Courts evaluating 5 1557's application to disparate impact may also
consider the intent of other actors with a staunch commitment to the
legislation. 2 2 For example, as President Obama and his administration
were closely involved in ensuring the legislation passed, they lauded its
potential role in helping consumers avoid several kinds of discrimination
and ill treatment. 123 Congress and the President's plan to address abuses in
the health insurance industry is evident in PPACA's prohibition of several
specific types of discrimination.
24
Section 1557 also extends the coverage of existing civil rights law.
Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination Act explicitly do not
cover insurance contracts, 12 which are now included in § 1557's definition
of the federal financial assistance subject to its protections.' 26 Also, the
prohibition on sex discrimination under Title IX was previously confined
to federally funded education and training programs. 27 By including Title
IX among the statutes whose protected classes are also covered by § 1557,
Congress made discrimination on the basis of sex actionable against a
variety of entities in health care. These changes indicate the drafters' intent
to expand civil rights law well beyond its previous boundaries.
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance) ("[W]omen are discriminated against today in America
in various ways .... It is another reason this health care reform is going to mean so much
for so many Americans."); 156 CoNG. REC. H1855 (2010) (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer,
House Majority Leader) ("It is more control .... [f]or consumers, and less for insurance
companies. It is the end of discrimination against Americans with preexisting conditions,
and the end of medical bankruptcy and caps on benefits.").
122. ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1020 (citing cases using presi-
dential transmittal letters or speeches advocating legislation as "useful legislative history").
123. See The President's Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/
health-care/plan (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (listing bans on three types of discrimination
among the top eight priorities).
124. E.g., PPACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-300gg-3 (2011) (adding several con-
sumer protections to the Public Health Service Act). See 156 CONG. REC. S12594 (2009)
(statement of Sen. Dick Durbin, Ass't Majority Leader) ("We have built into the front end
of this bill what we call the health care bill of rights. It is about time somebody stood up
for families and individuals across America who have been treated very poorly by health
insurance companies." (referencing discrimination against those with preexisting medical
conditions)).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2011) [Title VI]; 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2011) [Title IX];
45 C.FR. § 84.3(h) (2011) [§ 504 regulations]; 42 U.S.C. 6103(a)(4) (2011) [Age Dis-
crimination Act].
126. PPACA § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2011).
127. 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a) (2011) (application of Title IX to "any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
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3. Section 1557 Within Spending Clause Jurisprudence
Congress passed Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination
Act pursuant to its authority under the Spending Clause.'28 Courts analyze
these statutes in terms of a contract between the federal and state govern-
ments: Congress appropriates funding for certain purposes in exchange for
states' compliance with certain conditions.'2 9 Given this shared background,
courts have read jurisprudence from one Spending Clause statute into
another. "' Congress has also analyzed the four statutes in tandem, treating
them as subject to similar expansions and restrictions of scope when such
changes are relevant to their mutual Constitutional derivation. 3'
At times, courts have extended an interpretation of one Spending
Clause statute to the others listed in § 1557, and Congress has reacted
by clarifying its intent for all four such statutes to have a broader reach.
In Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court's Title IX-based ruling
132
resulted in the application of a restrictive definition for "program or
activity" to all four Spending Clause statutes. 3 3 Congress responded
with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.134 Section 1557 could
represent Congress' attempt to respond to the Court once more, this
time to Sandoval's deleterious effect on civil rights enforcement.
3
1
128. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States .... ").
129. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
130. E.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (finding that since courts may
not award punitive damages to plaintiffs bringing suit under Title VI, such damages are
similarly unavailable for private suits under both § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and § 504).
131. E.g., Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2011)
(abrogating states' sovereign immunity from private suits brought in federal court to en-
force these four statutes and any other federal statute prohibiting discrimination by FFA
recipients). See also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (finding that this stat-
ute reflected a ratification of Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667 (1979)).
132. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 574-75 (1984) (holding in relevant part
that even though some students received federal grants, only the college's financial aid
program was covered by Title IX, not the entire institution).
133. Days, supra note 33, at 989 (basing this extension of the Title IX interpretation
to all four statutes on the fact that the subsequent statutes used Title VI's original defini-
tion).
134. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). See 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d-4a (2011).The
Act made an entire institution subject to these four statutes, even if only part of the insti-
tution received federal funding. Days, supra note 33, at 989-90.
135. Sandoval's analysis has extended beyond Title VI to related civil rights statutes as
well. See Rosenbaum &Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 244-45 nn. 134-37 (citing cases with
such analysis under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX, and § 504). See also Days,
supra note 33, at 1001 (finding Sandova's impact on civil rights enforcement to be "pro-
found," similar to Grove City College's effect beyond Title IX).
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Restoring a private right of action for disparate impact claims would
help cure the weak enforcement that has exacerbated historical dispari-
ties in access to quality health care.
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
Part III assesses the difficulties that a court might have in recogniz-
ing a plaintiff's § 1557 suit, both in accepting this right of action and in
applying it to a claim of disparate impact discrimination by any member
of§ 1557's protected classes.
A. Counterarguments
As noted earlier, interpreting § 1557 as providing a private right of
action for disparate impact discrimination, available to all of its protected
classes, would neutralize the effect of Sandoval. Given Sandoval's require-
ment that a statutory right of action extend only to conduct proscribed
by the statute itself, courts may ask why § 1557 does not spell out its cov-
erage of disparate impact more explicitly. Courts may also question how
the various statutes' existing enforcement regimes would interact going
forward and why Congress' previous failure to pass a statute that would
have achieved the same result does not foreclose this interpretation.
1. Inadequate Notice of a Private Right of Action
Since Title VI, Title IX, § 504, and the Age Discrimination Act were
passed under the Spending Clause, courts have analyzed their scope and
remedies with a contractual metaphor: asking whether states have re-
ceived adequate notice of their duties as would be required in a
traditional contract. 3 6 Cases finding no private right of action under a
Spending Clause statute often do so after finding there was no clear intent
to confer the "specific, individually enforceable rights" that would have
put the states on notice.'
While Congress used language in § 1557 that in other statutes
creates such rights, 13 8 courts may rely on the general requirement of
136. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("The legiti-
macy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
state voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' ... Accordingly, if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously." (citations omitted)).
137. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 (2002) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"in the light shed by Pennhurst" to find "no basis for private enforcement, even by a class
of the statute's principal beneficiaries").
138. See supra note 86.
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notice to question Congress' use of the phrase "enforcement mecha-
nisms" instead of words that point more directly to a right or cause of
action.'39 Sometimes the phrase denotes administrative action, such as
the ability of an agency head to reduce funding to grantees that do not
comply with a statutory requirement. But "enforcement mechanism" is
not a term of art: courts'40 and Congress14 ' also use it in a general way,
encompassing litigation that complements agency action in enforcing a
given statute.'42 Courts may also use the phrase "administrative enforce-
ment mechanism" to distinguish agency action. 4 3 Furthermore, there is
no indication in 5 1557 that each listed statute's enforcement mecha-
nisms apply only to its own protected classes. In other words, the
existence of a right of action under 5 504 for disparate impact does not
preclude such a right of action from being made available more broad-
ly.14 4 Given that the phrase "enforcement mechanism" has often been
interpreted as including rights of action, courts are likely to find that
5 1557 has provided sufficient notice to its covered entities and construe
its private right of action as reaching disparate impact.
139. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2011) (making available the "remedies, procedures,
and rights set forth" in Title VI and, for certain purposes, in Title VII [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2011)] for violations of§ 504).
140. E.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 360 (1992) (referring to "enforcement
mechanisms" under the Adoption Act). The Adoption Act's enforcement mechanisms in-
clude both a private right of action and the Secretary's authority to reduce or eliminate
federal financial assistance to noncompliant recipients. 42 U.S.C. % 674(d) (1), (3) (2011).
141. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(5) (2011) (referring to "accessible, expedi-
tious, and effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement mechanisms"). In the
civil rights context, "enforcement" is not limited to courts: the Fair Housing Act Amend-
ments of 1988 include a civil action within the permitted "enforcement by private
persons." 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2011).
142. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 548 E2d 1277, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1977)
(describing the "enforcement mechanism" intended to result from the parallels between
5 504 and related civil rights statutes as including both administrative and private action);
Sindram v. Fox, 374 Fed. App'x 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2010) ("The [Age Discrimination Act's]
enforcement mechanism includes federal agency oversight and a private cause of action for
injunctive relief against a recipient of federal funds.").
143. E.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1983) (con-
trasting a "compensatory private remedy" with "the administrative enforcement
mechanism expressly provided by § 602 of Title VI"); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S.
667, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (distinguishing a right of action from Title IX's
"administrative enforcement mechanism").
144. See Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 346 E3d 403, 427 (3d Cit. 2003)
(finding that by cross-listing statutes without providing further guidance, Congress intend-
ed such crossover and wanted courts to define those rights of action more precisely)
(citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 293-94
(1993)).
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2. Existing Enforcement Regimes
Since courts have sometimes found complex administrative
enforcement to preclude a private right of action, judges may also express
concern regarding these statutes' existing regimes.'45 Federal agencies have
promulgated detailed regulations under each ofTitleVI,Title IX, 5 504, and
the Age Discrimination Act to govern their administrative enforcement.146
Subsequent statutes' enforcement regulations largely incorporate those of
Title VI,'47 but some aspects of the regulations differ in accordance with
unique characteristics of each statute's protected class.'48 Although a right of
action could pose complications, the Secretary of HHS has the statutory
authority to promulgate regulations clarifying this interaction, 49 and the
Department of Justice has developed expertise in coordinating federal
agencies' enforcement of these statutes."' Since the existing civil rights
enforcement regime in health care has proven inadequate, and mechanisms
exist for coordination among agencies, § 1557's private right of action for
disparate impact should not hinge on its listed statutes' other enforcement
mechanisms.'
3. Congress' Previous Inaction
Courts may find that since the House and Senate did not take action
on a prior bill that would have made a private right of action explicitly
available for disparate impact claims under Title VI, Title IX, and the Age
Discrimination Act, Congress did not intend to create one with § 1557.
Responding to the Sandoval decision, among others, Senator Edward
145. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001) ("The express provision of
one method of enforcing a substantive rule 'suggests that Congress intended to preclude
others.' ") (citations omitted)). See also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289-90 (2002)
(finding that the available "administrative procedures" distinguished that case from others
where the Court had found a private right of action).
146. Days, supra note 33, at 1000-01.
147. See 45 C.ER. § 86.71 (2011) (Title IX enforcement regulations provide that
"[t]he procedural provisions applicable to [Tjitle VI ... are hereby adopted and incorpo-
rated herein by reference."); id. § 84.61 (same for § 504); id. § 91.47 (providing that
certain HHS Title VI regulations-for hearings, decisions, and post-termination proceed-
ings-apply to HHS enforcement of the Age Discrimination Act).
148. See discussion of§ 504 regulations, infra note 170.
149. PPACA § 1557(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(c) (2011).
150. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12250, supra note 101; Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed.
Reg. 159 % 1, 3 (Aug. 16, 2000).
151. See Zeigler, supra note 30, at 142 & n.30 (recognizing that although private
actions could conceivably "usurp an agency's responsibility for regulatory implementa-
tion," such actions may instead supplement private enforcement, "which is often
inadequate because of budget restraints") and discussion of the inadequate enforcement by
HHS OCR, supra notes 12-2 1.
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Kennedy and Representatives John Conyers, John Lewis, and George
Miller introduced the Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a
Stronger Society (FAIRNESS) Act, which in relevant part was intended to
clarify the existence of such a right of action for disparate impact discrimi-
nation by recipients of federal funding.' 2 The bill was introduced in the
relevant House and Senate committees in February of 2004 but never
received a hearing.'53 Courts sometimes view Congress' rejection of a prior
proposal as disapproval of the underlying bill and therefore refuse to read
subsequent enactments broadly. 4 Scholars have frequently questioned this
interpretation of Congressional inaction,' however, and courts often do
not consider it a reliable indication of Congressional intent.' 6 Such inaction
is disregarded especially when, as here, the bill did not even receive a com-
mittee hearing, much less actual debate in either house of Congress.' 7
152. H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004). See Days, supra note 33, at 1003-04 (providing
the FAIRNESS Act as an example of Congress' pattern of reacting to restrictive Supreme
Court interpretations of civil rights statutes with corrective legislation).
153. Bill Sumniary & Status 108th Congress (2003-2004) H.R. 3809, LIBRARY OF
CONG., http://thomas.gov/ (follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink; select 108th Congress;
search for Bill Number H.R. 3809; then follow "All Congressional Actions" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 8,2011).
154. See ESiRIDcE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1026 (citing Hamdan v.
Rumisfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2765-66 (2006); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (describing Brown & Williamson as "the most lavish deploy-
ment in the Court's history" of this method of interpretation); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); United States v.Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984)).
155. ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1026 (Given the many reasons
Congress might reject a bill, "[slimple non-action, being consistent with many explana-
tions in circumstances not calling for consensus, has no probative value for any purpose.").
See also Eskridge, Inaction, supra note 90, at 98-99, 99 n.181 (detailing structural reasons
why inaction does not reliably indicate Congress' intent and providing the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1988 as an example); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the
Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 741
(1984) ("[T]here exists no legal or functional justification for the imputation of any mean-
ing to the necessarily frequent and prolonged silences of Congress.").
156. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S.Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. Unit-
ed States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) ("Ordinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to
attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular legislation. We have
observed that 'unsuccessful attempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative
intent: " (citation omitted)). Bob Jones was an exception to this rule, since thirteen unsuc-
cessful bills in twelve years constituted "overwhelming evidence of acquiescence" to an
existing agency interpretation. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 169 n.5.
157. See ESKRIDGE, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 1049 (citing cases where
courts have used the rejected proposal rule when Congress had previously debated a bill
in conference committee or on the floor of one house).
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B. Limitations
The statutes listed in § 1557 give rise to its disparate impact right of
action, yet they have the potential to restrict the reach of this right.
Specifically, the scope of the right of action under § 1557 may be limited
by § 504 case law interpreting disparate impact in the disability context,
and its remedies may be limited by what courts have found available in
Spending Clause litigation.
1. Scope of the Right of Action
Even as courts recognize a disparate impact private right of action
under § 1557,judges are likely to require a limiting principle. Since § 504
is the only one of § 1557's listed statutes that currently confers such a
right of action,158 its jurisprudence would provide a readily available
source of guidance. The limitations courts have imposed on § 504 suits-
seeking to recognize some but not infinite disparate impact claims-may
therefore apply to suits brought under § 1557.1s9
Courts evaluate § 504 disparate impact claims with a rather
imprecise test that attempts to balance "the need to give effect to the
statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within manageable
bounds."'60 In recognizing a private right of action but ruling against the
plaintiffs on the merits, the Court in Choate relied on the "balance struck
in [Southeastern Community College v.] Davis,''161 which requires that "an
otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with
meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers."'62 Although the
Court deliberately did not confine the scope of the right of action that it
recognized, subsequent courts have interpreted the Choate Court's reasons
for denying relief' 63 -responding to the need to balance interests between
158. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text, regarding re-enactment and the
influence ofjudicial interpretations of civil rights legislation on subsequent, related bills.
160. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1985).
161. Southeastern Crnty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In Davis, a plaintiff with
a significant hearing disability sought admission to be trained as a registered nurse; the
college denied her application, believing that she would not be able to perform safely in
the workplace. Id. at 401-02. The Court found that the accommodations requested by the
plaintiff constituted "fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of the program" that were "far
more than the 'modification' the regulation requires," id. at 409, and held that the college
had not violated § 504, id. at 412.
162. Choate, 469 U.S. at 301-02.
163. Id. (Under this test, Tennessee's reduction in annual Medicaid-covered inpatient
coverage was not disparate impact discrimination because (1) the coverage limit did not
use criteria that had a "particular exclusionary effect" on people with disabilities; (2) the
reduction in covered days was "neutral on its face" and did not determine those whose
coverage would be reduced based on a test or trait that the disabled are less likely to meet
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grantees and protected classes-as substantive guidance." The Court did,
however, note a few incomplete aspects of the record, implying that
support on these points could build future arguments.61
The effect of § 504 jurisprudence on § 1557's right of action may
also be limited by distinguishing this rather ambiguous case law from
future claims. As noted above, the Choate Court analyzed Tennessee's
obligations under the federal Medicaid Act, which provides uniform
benefits for all beneficiaries and grants significant discretion to states in
structuring such benefits. 66 To the extent that this limit on successful
claims depends on the authorizing statute's scope and purpose, suits
against discrimination proscribed by more generous provisions of the
health reform legislation may be more successful. 67 Also, in ruling
against the plaintiffs the Choate Court relied on the relatively limited
harm caused by the state's coverage limitations.'68 Future plaintiffs may
experience greater hardship that enables their claim to succeed in court.
or have; (3) the record did not indicate that people with disabilities would be "unable to
benefit meaningfully" from the new level of coverage; and (4) the reduction would affect
all Medicaid beneficiaries, with and without disabilities).
164. See Cary LaCheen, Using Title 1I of the Americans With Disabilities Act [ADA] on
Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs, 8 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 1, 108-09 (2001) (cit-
ing disparate impact cases that were brought under or analyze § 504, demonstrating
greater success when "challenging program administration or design features that exclude
people with disabilities from programs altogether or that adversely affect initial access to
services," and less success when "the amount or duration of services provided" is at issue;
compare Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F3d 1480, 1483-85 (9th Cir. 1996) (using a § 504 analy-
sis to find defendants liable under the ADA for requiring that blind persons' guide dogs,
like all other dogs, be quarantined upon arrival in Hawaii); Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler, 939
F. Supp. 765, 769-73 (D. Haw. 1996) (categorically excluding blind and disabled persons
from participating in a pilot health care program constituted disparate impact under both
the ADA and § 504); and Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F Supp. 1360, 1366-73 (D. Neb. 1993)
(university found liable under the ADA and § 504 for a policy precluding a disabled stu-
dent from having a roommate), with Choate, 469 U.S. 302-04, 309; Doe v. Colautti, 592
F2d 704, 707-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (limit on Medicaid coverage of private mental health
institutions, with no comparable limit on inpatient hospital coverage, was not disparate
impact)).
165. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302 n.22 (There was no suggestion that "the illnesses
uniquely associated with the handicapped or occurring with greater frequency among
them" could not be treated under the new limits. Also, the limit affected all Medicaid pa-
tients seeking inpatient care, "regardless of the particular cause of hospitalization.").
166. Id. at 303 (Medicaid guarantees a "particular package of services:' not "adequate
health care" for each individual, and grants discretion to states' choice of "the proper mix
of amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage, as long as care and services are
provided in 'the best interests of the recipients.'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19)
(2011))).
167. For examples of such provisions, see supra notes 3, 27.
168. Choate, 469 U.S. at 303 (finding that since only 5% of Medicaid recipients with
disabilities needed more hospital coverage than the new limits would provide, the majority
of needs were met).
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Finally, courts may follow the lead of the Choate Court in distin-
guishing § 1557 from Title VI. Although § 504 was modeled on Title VI,
which was confined to intentional discrimination, the Choate Court
interpreted § 504 as extending to disparate impact by finding significant
differences in the statutes' protected classes and legislative history.169
Partly due to disability-related legal doctrines that are not relevant to
other protected classes, courts have found it necessary to limit what is
required of entities that are compelled to make such accommodations. 7
Moreover, in finding that the private right of action under § 504 could
be used for disparate impact claims, the Supreme Court relied not only
on Congress' intent for the statute itself to cover such discrimination,1 71
but also-significantly-on federal agencies' regulations to that effect.17 1
In recognizing disparate impact claims under § 1557, courts may find
that Congress intended for § 1557 to incorporate such regulations into
its text. 73
2. Available Remedies
The remedies available in § 1557 litigation may also be subject to the
same limits as other Spending Clause suits, particularly for disparate impact
claims. Courts have found that punitive damages are not available for viola-
tions of these statutes 74 and have further limited the remedies for disparate
impact.'75 Non-economc compensatory damages may still be available in
169. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
170. For example, regulations for administrative enforcement of § 504 require a "rea-
sonable accommodation" to the needs of individuals with disabilities unless it would entail
an "undue hardship." 45 C.ER. 5 84.12 (2011). See Days, supra note 33, at 994 (finding
that, at least as contemplated by the Americans with Disabilities Act, these requirements
"go beyond the concept of 'equal treatment' that has been at the core of the earlier civil
rights statutes"). See also 45 C.FR. § 84.4 (2011) ("[A]ids, benefits, and services" under the
Rehabilitation Act need not "produce the identical result or level of achievement" for
individuals with and without disabilities, but must instead give those with disabilities
"equal opportunity" "in the most integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs.").
171. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295.
172. Id. at 297 n.17. See Rosenbaum &Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 221 (finding that
federal agencies' common Title VI regulations, including the disparate impact standard,
"remain in force and virtually unchanged").
173. See Part II.B. 1, supra.
174. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). See also Days, supra note 33, at
981 94 (explaining that Barnes carried such a limitation from Title VI jurisprudence into
consideration of available remedies under the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504).
175. Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, 505 F3d 1173, 1190 (1lth Cir. 2007) (find-
ing that "the Court has suggested, without deciding, that victims of unintentional
discrimination [under Spending Clause statutes] may be limited to prospective relief pre-
venting future violations ... ").
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some cases, 176 however, and injunctive relief may afford great benefits to
plaintiffs and other members of protected classes by requiring defendants to
cease discriminatory actions or by mandating nondiscriminatory ones.
Moreover, such limits should apply more to litigation against defendants
subject to § 1557 due to their receipt of federal funds than to other covered
entities. 17
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's ruling in Sandoval hurt plaintiffs'
ability to obtain redress for adverse impact discrimination under Title VI,
PPACA § 1557 may circumvent such limits by providing a private right of
action for disparate impact claims in health care. Even if courts find such a
right of action to be limited to the types of cases that have proven most
successful under § 504, and even if a suit falters under the remaining
burdens of proving disparate impact, litigation may still gain the attention of
current and potential defendants and motivate a settlement that changes
harmful behavior.' 78 Also, § 1557 may reflect Congress' willingness to
resuscitate the private attorney general model of enforcement. This
paradigm shift may motivate HHS to reexamine the importance of OCR's
mission: with plaintiffs better able to get their day in court, the agency may
increase OCR's funding to avoid such suits. Effective, strategic
administrative action may promote the predictability prized by many
agencies in ensuring industry compliance and dramatically decrease the
need for private litigation.
176. Id. at 1198 (determining that this is the first appellate court case to consider this
question since Barnes).
177. Id. (finding that the Barnes Court's "central reason for turning to the contract
metaphor" was to ensure that FFA recipients had adequate notice of the liability incurred
by virtue of accepting such funds). In addition to FFA recipients, PPACA § 1557 applies
to "any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity
established under this title (or amendments)." 42 U.S.C. 5 18116(a) (2011). While the
health insurance exchanges-which were established under that title-will receive federal
funds at first, they must become financially independent after 2014. 42 U.S.C.
§ 18031(d)(5)(A) (2011). This provision ensures that they will still be subject to § 1557.
Courts are unlikely to analyze the exchanges with the Spending Clause contract metaphor
after that point.
178. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 12, at 243.
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